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Abstract: In analysing the availability and performance of the foreign capital in developing countries too 
much attention has been given to the availability of capital and current account whilst far too little has been 
given to long-term investment, job creation and economic sovereignty. The current study centres on a 
critical review of available literature and a contribution to the substantive topics indicated in the title. The 
objective is to examine relevant empirical and theoretical studies. The study argues that following the 
adoption of capital liberalisation and neoliberalism, the economies of most developing countries have 
become more vulnerable. If China is excluded, we find that most developing economies have been unable 
to expand employment opportunities or reduce levels of poverty due to fear of capital flight. In recent 
years capital liberalisation policy has encouraged capital flight from their economies. After 2008, the IMF 
publicly express support for capital controls as a result of the global financial crisis and as the 
vulnerabilities associated with capital flows.  
Key Words: developing countries; capital control; financialization and instability 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This study aims to provide a deeper understanding of developing economies, by not simply 
re-emphasising the importance of capital control, but also highlighting the dynamics of 
transition that these economies are facing. The word “capital” can be used to refer to “foreign 
direct investment,” that is capital invested into productive assets, which is not liquid, and 
“portfolio investment and bank loans,” which are highly liquid and could have wider impact 
on a country’s economy if left to flow unrestricted across borders. Financial liberalisation is a 
set of measures including central bank autonomy and freedom of movement of capital, and 
can also mean convertibility of currency, abandoning “priority sectors,” and adopting a policy  
of lending at differential interest rates to promote strategic sectors or industries in the 
domestic economy (Chang and Grabel 2014). 
Economists refer to capital control as a range of policies that are designed to manage 
global capital flows. Such policy initiatives can take many forms. For instance, restrictions 
can be placed on foreign investment in certain sectors, on capital outflows, or on access to the 
domestic or foreign currencies. Capital control received more support following the East 
Asian crisis in 1997–98 since previous policies of capital liberalisation as a result of IMF 
pressures resulted in a huge inflow of foreign capital into the East Asian economies, which 
was reflected in a lending boom and domestic banks taking greater risks. The government 
failed to prevent funds from being used to finance speculative activities (Dymski 2010). 
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Policy can place restrictions on foreign capital investment in domestic assets 
(government securities and bank deposits), or on domestic capital moving abroad. As extreme 
measures to control market forces, the government may impose control over international 
transactions. If the government wants to have virtual control over foreign exchange, it can 
decide who they would like to distribute those foreign currencies, the advantage being that 
with such measures it can influence the markets. Capital control can provide greater options 
for economic matters and policies, especially fiscal and monetary policies (Dymski 2010). 
The balance of payments can also be influenced by capital control measures. 
Those in favour of capital liberalisation argue that capital will flow from the developed 
countries, where it provides low marginal returns, to developing countries where it is 
assumed that it is scarce, meaning that free capital movement would imply high marginal 
returns (Crotty and Epstein 1999; Siddiqui 2016). They subscribe to the policy of removing 
foreign exchange controls in developing countries so that they can run large current account 
deficits. This means that capital account liberalisation was expected to delink investment 
from domestic savings. Following such policies was expected to increase investment in 
developing countries meaning that would have more capital, which would be greater than 
their domestic savings, and would invest more, and ultimately, they would have higher 
growth rates. As Maurice Obstfeld (1998, 28) has noted, 
 
economic theory leaves no doubt about the potential advantages” of capital account 
liberalization, which is also sometimes called financial openness. This permits the international 
capital market to channel world savings to their most profitable regions in the world. Those 
developing countries with has little domestic savings can borrow to finance investment, thereby 
could experience growth rates without requiring sharp increases in their own saving. However, 
Obstfeld also warns the possible risks of openness to foreign financial flows and concluded that 
“this duality of benefits and risks is inescapable in the real world. 
 
The relationship between financial openness and economic growth is far from straight 
forward. Most surprisingly, the recent the IMF study (2016) has openly expressed scepticism 
about its earlier position on neoliberalism. The IMF study argues:  
 
Some capital inflows, such as foreign direct investment—which may include a transfer of 
technology or human capital—do seem to boost long-term growth. But the impact of other 
flows—such as portfolio investment and banking and especially hot, or speculative, debt 
inflows—seem neither to boost growth nor allow the country to better share risks with its 
trading partners . . . This suggests that the growth and risk-sharing benefits of capital flows 
depend on which type of flow is being considered; it may also depend on the nature of 
supporting institutions and policies . . . Although growth benefits are uncertain, costs in terms of 
increased economic volatility and crisis frequency seem more evident. Since 1980, there have 
been about 150 episodes of surges in capital inflows in more than 50 emerging market 
economies. (Ostry et al. 2016) 
 
In fact, since the adoption of neoliberal reforms in the 1980s, the inflow of foreign 
capital into the economies of developing countries has risen sharply; however, not all of them 
experienced rapid growth (Siddiqui 2014a). The adoption of a capital liberalisation policy did 
lead to a rise in growth rates in some developing countries, but exposed them to economic 
vulnerability and financial crisis. Those in favour of capital liberalisation suggest that this 
largely happened due to short-term inflows, which increase the risk of sudden capital flow 
reversals (Bonizzi 2014). On the other hand, critics of this policy such as Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980) highlighted the difficulties of capital liberalisation, concluding that there is a 
high correlation between domestic saving and investment ratios. Other studies also found that 
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most of the East Asian countries that have had high growth rates also had very high domestic 
savings and were net creditors, not net borrowers, and also had a current account surplus. 
Capital liberalization is one of the most controversial aspects of modern political 
economy. The problem seems to be due not only to liberalisation rules governing inflows of 
capital but to those affecting portfolio capital investments, which is short-term and 
speculative. Here, we intend to examine why capital liberalisation has become so important 
to the economy of a country and why neglecting this or leaving it to market forces, has 
frequently led to economic instability in developing countries in recent years. The experience 
of the Latin America and East Asian countries in the 1990s shows that those countries made 
the effort to become financially more open and integrated, paradoxically witnessed higher 
levels of economic and financial instability (Ocampo and Stiglitz 2008; Siddiqui 1998). 
During the East Asian crisis of 1997, capital flows were seen as an important element in 
the currency and exchange rate crisis. Therefore, control of capital movements has been 
suggested as a means of supporting fixed exchange rates and avoiding speculative attacks on 
currencies. A “developmental model” followed earlier in the East Asian countries meant 
governments undertook a number of independent policy measures to reduce vulnerability to 
global financial shocks (Wade 1990). The strategy of East Asian export-oriented economies 
has been to achieve higher domestic savings relative to investment. Policy intervention helps 
to maintain desirable exchange rates and competitiveness. At the same time the accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves allows them to maintain the undervaluation of foreign exchange 
rate to stimulate exports. 
There has been wide discussion concerning whether the East Asian crisis was due to 
“over-lending” and “over-borrowing,” which might have been re-enforced by distortions in 
incentives or regulations. Commenting on the reasons for this crisis Arestis and Glickman 
(2002) note, 
 
The most striking of these relates to the question of whether the source of the Asian crisis was 
endogenous or exogenous and the related issue of the coincidence or otherwise of financial 
liberalisation and financial crisis. A further crucial difference is that whilst [the conventional 
view] holds one group of actors or another to blame our Minskyan thesis incorporates all of 
them into an endogenous interpretation of the crisis. (Arestis and Glickman 2002, 255) 
 
They argue that many developing countries lack the domestic savings and foreign capital 
that could help to finance their business activities. However, the proponents of foreign capital 
ignore the fact that certain types of foreign capital can provide long-term investment and 
business commitment, while other capital inflows might be short-term and less stable. When 
economic crisis hit these developing countries, capital rapidly left them for the safety of 
developed economies (Minsky 1986). 
The methodology followed here is derived from the aims of the study and comparisons 
of international statistics are used as the main means of addressing the research questions and 
the objectives of this paper. Analysing relevant literature, empirical studies, and existing 
secondary data is the only possible way to obtain macroeconomic data. These include data 
from official sources and from international institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, OECD 
and UNCTAD. 
The study also intends to critically examine the wider issues related to the capital 
movements in the developing countries including their economic stability and sovereignty. 
Financial globalisation represents a very important development in recent global economy. In 
this current phase of globalization, capital is far more mobile than it ever was in the past. In 
fact, the colonial period was characterised by segregation in the world economy, despite free 
trade, and no legal means was in place to control the flow of capital from the metropolis to 
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the colonies (Siddiqui 2015a). However, despite the availability of low wages, capital did not 
move freely in the colonies, except in certain limited spheres such as mining, railways and 
plantations (Chang and Grabel 2014; Siddiqui 1989). The neo-classical model of perfect 
competition, with perfect information and perfect capital markets does not hold in the real 
world. 
Since 1980s and up till 2008 financial crisis, capital liberalization was said to be good 
for developing countries, a policy which was imposed through “structural adjustment 
programme” and “globalisation” by the World Bank and IMF. The World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) also supports capital liberalisation and suggests that it is good for growth, as it 
provided more capital for investments. However, it does not provide any clear evidence that 
this is promoting economic stability in the developing countries (Crotty and Epstein 1999). 
In December 2015, WTO’s ministerial conference in Nairobi explicitly discussed GATS 
(General Agreement on Trade in Services). During this meeting, as had previously been the 
case, it was obvious that the developed countries were keen to support capital liberalisation. 
In fact, in the developed countries services account for rising share of output and 
employment. In addition the manufacturing sector in these countries has generally become 
less competitive whilst the financial sector has become more significant and is dominated by 
the financial centres of New York, London and Frankfurt. Liberalisation in financial services 
was the most important element of globalisation, increasing the developed countries financial 
companies’ access into the markets of developing countries. This was possible due to the 
removal of domestic capital control measures and the reduction in domestic financial 
regulation in recent years. 
 
2. Capital Mobility, Current Account Surplus and Growth Rates 
Those countries that have witnessed rapid growth rates also have a considerable positive 
current account. With the non-availability of foreign capital inflows, countries with current 
account deficits are forced to devalue, and as a result imports are more expensive and exports 
cheaper. Such policy measures are expected to lead to improvements in the balance of 
payments situation. The liberalisation of capital measures increases capital inflows, but may 
also lead to appreciation in exchange rates, as witnessed in many developing countries in 
recent years, which drove down their export demands and increased imports, leading to 
negative current accounts and currency crises. For example, in China in the early 2000s, the 
central bank intervened in the foreign exchange markets to keep Renminbi appreciation under 
control (Bond and Garcia 2015). As Figure 1 shows, the relationship between current account 
surplus and growth rates has been positive. 
In Figure 2, the upper left-hand quadrant shows current account deficits matched to 
capital account surplus as is often seen in text books. However, in the lower right-hand 
quadrant countries such as Russia and Nigeria show the problems associated with the 
“resource-curse.” Such countries appear to have capital account deficits, which are financed 
by current account surplus. Periodic overvaluation may be caused by large inflows of foreign 
capital associated with their resource sector, a case of the so-called “Dutch disease,” meaning 
a loss of competitiveness in their export sector. However, when the current account surplus is 
not available to finance capital outflows; this would mean mounting pressures for devaluation 
and currency crises.  
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Figure1. Average Annual Growth Rates of GDP per capita and Average Current Account 
Balance, 1970–2013 
Source: Calculations based on the World Bank, Development Indicators and IMF, Balance of 
Payments, various years. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Average current account balance and capital flows to large developing countries (% 
GDP 2000–2014) 
Source: IMF Balance of Payments; various years, IMF. 
 
 
The UNDP (2013) report recommends a number of neoliberal policies such as further 
integration with the global markets, to adhere rules of global governance, and financial 
liberalisation. However, the report ignores the fact that increased dependence on foreign 
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markets would mean increased vulnerability to the volatile nature of global finance, which 
has been in the recent past marked by speculation, capital flights, and economic crises. Such 
policies would run counter to the developing countries aim of economic sovereignty, and also 
pro-poor, and poverty alleviation goals of the economic inclusion agenda. As Soederberg 
(2015) argues:  
 
[Financial liberalisation] has done little to deliver on the neoliberal promise of growth and 
progress through investments in production and thus the creation of stable and sustainable 
wages and, by extension, poverty reduction. Indeed, the increased frequency and intensity of 
financial debacles has made the South, and especially the poor therein, more susceptible to the 
aftershocks of speculative-led accumulation. (Soederberg 2015, 253) 
 
There has been a rapid increase in capital flows in recent years due to gross inflows of 
private capital from nearly 6% of GDP in 1991 to more than double that amount in 
developing countries in 2013. This was an unprecedented development but at the same time it 
has made these economies more vulnerable to the perils of financial globalisation. 
In the post-war period state control over cross-border capital flows was seen to be a very 
important policy measure within the macroeconomic framework. It was intended to ensure 
that the State could act without fear of triggering capital outflows, i.e. not having to be 
concerned about what disgruntled financiers, who might otherwise have taken their funds out, 
thought of its actions. The Bretton Woods system was introduced soon after the Second 
World War, allowing countries to have capital controls, and all of them had such controls in 
place. In the post-war period, capital control, both in the developing and the developed 
countries, was considered to be a normal part of policy measures, seen as essential 
government tools of economic management. Governments deployed capital control measures 
to enhance macroeconomic policies aimed at controlling and promoting financial and 
currency stability. In fact, this form of control was seen as a useful tool for promoting 
industrialization and competitiveness (Grabel 2006). 
During the period 2000–2007 in particular, developing countries received large capital 
inflows, fuelled by the availability of cheap credit in the developed countries and booming 
commodity prices (Bonizzi 2014). The experiences of nearly two decades of crises including 
that of Mexico in 1997, East Asia in 1997–98, and Argentina in 2001, sparked discussions 
about the need for prudent measures to manage capital flows in developing countries. The 
cycle of boom and bust experienced by several developing countries necessitated a clear 
policy regarding how to deal with the capital inflows during the boom and how to respond to 
a situation of sudden and rapid outflows of capital during economic crisis.  
The capital liberalisation of the last two decades has increased consumption and output 
variability. However, if capital inflows are dominated by the portfolio this could have adverse 
consequences for the developing countries. As Stiglitz (2004, 63) argues,  
 
Capital market liberalization [in East Asia and Latin America] has played a role in contributing to 
economic instability. Money rushed into the country, often financing a consumption binge, and 
then rushed out; as it left, financial institutions were weakened, often bankrupted, and exchange 
rates plummeted, leaving those with dollar-denominated debts hard pressed to meet their 
obligations. During the inflows, the exchange rate appreciates, posing problems for the import 
competing and export sectors. Some governments (Thailand in the mid-1990s) attempt to 
prevent this and at the same time, avoid the economy overheating; this necessitates cutting back 
on high-return public investment and raising interest rates [. . .] During the outflows, financial 
institutions are devastated, and the lack of credit contributes to the economic downturn.  
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It would be useful here to re-consider the merits of two widely used economic 
formulations, namely the Mundell-Fleming “impossible trinity” and the Taylor Rule of 
monetary policy. According to Mundell-Fleming, a country can only have two of the 
following three: monetary sovereignty, a fixed exchange rate, and free capital flows. The 
Taylor Rule is bound by which a central bank adjusts its short-term interest rates based on the 
differential between a country’s potential and actual GDP, and between the inflation target 
and actual inflation. Developing countries may be constrained to respond to the external 
financial cycle, which could distort the Taylor Rule. In fact, if domestic growth concerns 
warrant low interest rates, a sudden fall in capital inflows may induce them to raise interest 
rates to attract foreign capital thereby exacerbating the downturn in the business cycle.  
  
3. IMF Response to Capital Mobility Issue 
The governments of developing countries are consistently told that capital control is 
impossible to enforce or too disruptive of normal global business relationships and may also 
encourage corruption. There is no doubt that IMF prescriptions in recent years have shown 
more flexibility than in the past when managing countries in crisis. However, the IMF still 
lends support to neo-liberal strategies and justifies this on the grounds that in the long term 
such policies will help developing countries. Overall its prescriptions on this issue have been 
incoherent.  
In the wake of the East Asian crisis of 1997, many developing countries greatly 
increased their foreign exchange reserve so that they would a bigger cushion in the event of 
future crisis but this additional reserve is not being used to promote faster growth They also 
have to maintain higher rates of interests because under open capital market conditions; 
capital can leave the country en masse. Higher interest rates increase the cost of borrowing, 
which could discourage local businesses from borrowing and investing.  
A few developing countries have imposed capital controls as a means of protecting 
domestic economies from the effects of global liberalised financial markets and in recent 
years the IMF has been less critical about such policies. However, this can be contrasted with 
its response when Malaysia imposed capital control during the East Asian crisis in the late 
1990s. Then the IMF referred to this control of capital outflows as a backwards step and one 
IMF representative stated that “foreign investors in Malaysia have been expropriated, and the 
Malaysians will bear the cost of their distrust for years” (quoted in Kaplan and Rodrik 2001, 
11). In December 2006, capital controls in Thailand were reversed after only a few days by 
its Central Bank when a military coup replaced the previous elected government and such 
measures immediately triggered massive capital flights from the country. 
The Chilean government also undertook measures aimed at controlling capital inflows, 
requiring foreign investors to keep their investment in the country for at least one year, and a 
percentage of the investment to be placed in an interest-free deposit with the central bank. 
Such policies certainly can impact on short-term debt (Crotty and Epstein 1999). When South 
Korea removed capital control on short-term foreign bank borrowing, but imposed 
restrictions on long-term capital inflows such as foreign purchases of stocks and foreign 
direct investments, large scale borrowing by their banks resulted in the 1997 East Asian 
financial crisis (Chang and Grabel 2014). 
Excessive short-term foreign currency inflows could take place because local banks may 
borrow a lot of overseas capital. In such circumstances, imposing capital control may help to 
establish the supervision and regulation of the country’s financial system. Some argue that 
such provisions may be less effective in the long term, as investors and borrowers may find 
ways to undermine such regulations (Magud and Reinhart 2006). 
It is interesting to analyse Iceland’s experience of financial policy, since the country was 
advised to adopt capital control as a short-term strategy. It was the first country to sign the 
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Small Business Act (SBA) for Europe which is the EU’s flagship policy initiative to support 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). It comprises a set of policy measures ranging 
from “entrepreneurship” and “responsive administration” to “internationalisation.” To 
improve governance and entrepreneurship during the financial crisis in 2008, the SBA was 
the first financial rescue measure in the Western Europe since that of the UK in 1976. Iceland 
initially approached its Scandinavian neighbours for help and then Russia in 2008. When all 
these efforts failed, some Western European countries suggested that it should negotiate an 
arrangement with the IMF, which the country did in the late autumn of 2008. The SBA 
negotiation provisions recommended that Iceland should adopt stringent capital control 
measures, the deputy managing director of the IMF emphasising that it should make capital 
control an essential feature of the monetary policy framework, given the scale of potential 
capital outflows. Iceland initially imposed capital control prior to signing of SBA in October 
2008 and the IMF recommended that it was a necessity to maintain financial stability 
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2011). 
In 1991, the Icelandic government began to adopt neo-liberal economic policies, 
including privatisation of public assets. Stock markets and the housing sector experienced 
massive growth, and all these combined effects made Iceland’s per capita GDP one of the 
worlds’ highest by the 2006. However, in 2008 its economy collapsed, when the country’s 
three largest banks were forced to declare bankruptcy, and its GDP shrank sharply. 
Until the late 1980s, Iceland’s largest banks were state-owned and as a result capital was 
rationed amongst different sectors and industries. The government fixed nominal interest 
rates, and the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) was seen to be implementing government 
policies. However, banks were largely managed with the aim of benefitting political parties 
and market forces were introduced to break the stranglehold of the domestic economy. These 
steps were taken because state ownership of banks and other big businesses placed limits on 
the profit opportunities of the capitalist class in general and therefore, privatisation in the 
1990s was seen as a good avenue for investors. 
In the late 1980s, real interest rates were low and even negative for a long period in 
Iceland’s government-owned banks. As a result, credit demands soared with banks allocating 
credit to favoured businesses. This resulted in inefficiencies in resource allocation and debts 
rose relative to equity. 
 
4. Capital Flows and Monetary Policies 
Monetary theory predicts that when the exchange rate is fixed, capital flows will equalise 
domestic and international interest rates, in a situation when monetary policy is losing its 
ability to influence domestic activity. Similarly Obstfeld and Taylor have supported the view 
that it is impossible to maintain free capital flows, a fixed exchange rate and an independent 
monetary policy at the same time (Williamson 2007). 
At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, where the new post-war economic policies 
were agreed, J. M. Keynes said the single most important achievement agreed was that all 
countries should have the right to restrict capital movements, provided that the restrictions 
were not aimed at restricting trade. Keynes strongly believed that the earlier crises, such as 
the Great Depression and the Second World War, owed a great deal to the volatility induced 
by free capital movements. Therefore, according to him, the benefits of trade would be at risk 
if countries were to remove capital control. 
The US dollar is the dominant international currency. At present about three-quarters of 
the total global currency reserves are held in US dollars. The US has the biggest and most 
liquid capital market in the world but this is continuously maintained and supplied by US 
deficit financing. The US has also put all its efforts into encouraging the rest of the world to 
open their capital accounts and remove all impediments to the inflows and outflows of 
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capital. In the name of neo-liberal reforms, all forms of social control of the markets are 
reduced (Siddiqui 2009a; Zhang 2009). 
Another major discrepancy is that the macroeconomic policies applicable in the case of 
developed countries were too often recommended to developing countries, despite the fact 
that the economic structures, institutions and capital markets of the latter group are very 
different from those of the former. Mishkin (2004) identifies the difficulties faced by 
developing countries as being weak fiscal institutions, weak financial institutions including 
government regulation and vulnerability to sudden variations in capital flows. 
It is argued that financial integration allows domestic businesses in developing countries 
to borrow in anticipation of future incomes. Following such arguments led to the opening up 
of their capital accounts to international finance. However, it was soon realised that asset 
markets are different from goods markets, and in addition financial markets in developing 
countries are different from those in their developed counterparts.  
On the issue of outward-looking industrialization policy, Sen (2007, 293–94) argues that 
 
Japan and Korea had almost no foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, while others such as 
Singapore, and later China, had these in ample quantities . . . and the absence of any portfolio 
flows in the early stages of development. But the sharp contradictions in the fast growing 
economies of Asia, India liberalised both the current−and capital−account components of its 
balance of payments . . . this in spite of evidence showing that those who opened their capital 
accounts to anything more than FDI quickly landed themselves in trouble as in the Latin America.  
 
Malaysia undertook capital control measures in 1998 to prevent capital flight and 
increase its control over the domestic capital market and exchange rate value of its currency. 
The government adopted a number of measures in monetary and fiscal policies to address the 
domestic imbalances and to deal with the recession (Siddiqui 2009b). Malaysia’s control 
policies have produced a faster economic recovery, a lower reduction in employment, and a 
quicker turnaround in the stock market. Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) analysed how Malaysia 
was able to achieve this better performance and control capital flight in comparison to South 
Korea and Thailand. They found that unlike Thailand and South Korea where interest rates 
fell sharply, in Malaysia interest rates remained stable due to a ceiling of 2.5% points over the 
base lending rate. The Malaysian government was careful to target short-term speculative 
capital inflows, while insulating capital inflows. Malaysia recovered from the East Asian 
crisis more quickly and its exchange rates were stabilised, while those countries, which 
adopted the orthodox policies experienced a longer and deeper crisis. Malaysia’s Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamed was criticised for going against the region’s widely accepted 
liberalisation policies (Siddiqui 2012). With capital control the government in Malaysia can 
pursue its domestic economic policies without the worries of a balance of payments crisis. 
Speculative attacks in East Asia and Mexico were fuelled by large movements in inflows and 
outflows of capital. The Malaysian government set a limit on capital outflows in 1998 to help 
the economy and to regain financial stability. 
Gallagher’s (2014) cross-country study found that among the East Asian countries, those 
that had applied capital control were able to perform better. Similar results were found by the 
other empirical studies (Magud and Reinhart 2006). The Malaysian response to the East 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 offers an interesting lesson since soon after the crisis the 
country witnessed a rise in state ownership, as large numbers of family-owned enterprises 
were merged into state-owned firms. The differences between President Mahathir and his 
deputy Anwar Ibrahim become open, resulting in the removal of Ibrahim in 1998. As a result, 
Mahathir consolidated his power and all those businesses seen to be close to Ibrahim lost 
government favour. The government increased its grip over the corporate sector and banks, 
and ultimately influenced lending and credit policies with further shifts towards government-
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owned companies. Capital controls were aimed at minimising the risks of exit by large-scale 
investors, currency conversion by domestic and foreign asset holders and the risks associated 
with cross-border derivate (Gallagher 2014; Stiglitz 2004). These measures were intended to 
enhance the autonomy of domestic policy and to insulate the domestic economy from crises 
in other countries.  
However, the problem is the experiences of developing countries in the late 1970s, when 
the huge accumulation of liquidity in the banks based in developed countries led them to 
increase their lending and investment in the developing countries. Soon after the debt crisis in 
the 1980s, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 and more recently the global financial crisis 
of 2008, all made it clear that capital deregulation could lead to the loss of domestic 
sovereignty in macroeconomic policy, leading to a balance of payment crisis, currency 
instability, and capital flight.  
Financial deregulation has two elements: liberalization of international capital flows and 
deregulation of domestic financial systems. This has led to dramatic change in the financial 
sector. These changes have given rise to sharp rise in the financial speculation activities and 
also such development has strengthened the influence of financial in the economy. In fact, the 
deregulation and removal of control on international capital flows has created a situation 
where countries could run large current account deficits (or surplus). This also has opened the 
possibility of a debt-led growth model and as a result a consumption boom. A country’s 
exchange rates are often seen to be determined by capital flows rather than trade balances. 
Capital flows have often financial motives and are pro-cycle. As Stockhammer (2015) 
emphasises that:  
 
The deregulation of international capital flows has loosened external trade constraints. It has 
allowed countries to run larger current account deficits for longer periods...episodes of strong 
capital inflows (capital flow bonanzas) usually come with speculative bubbles on financial and 
property markets and typically end in recessions. Financial globalization has thus ironically 
increased the room for different developments across countries. Current account imbalances can 
be maintained for longer—essentially as long as markets trust the situation. (Stockhammer 2015, 
943) 
 
Financial liberalisation expands access to capital via greater inflow of capital such as 
foreign direct investment, portfolio flows and other types of capital movements. The 
developed countries also demand international standards on governing capital accounts, 
financial markets, exchange rates, accounting systems and banking operations. (Siddiqui 
2015a) Another major difficulty with capital liberalisation is that it brings increased 
dependence on monetary policy of international financial institutions such as the Federal 
Reserve and the European Central Bank. Low interest rates can flood developing countries 
with liquidity, heightening the risks for their economies when a tightening policy is imposed. 
A sudden slowdown in growth rates in international economies may lead to political unrest 
and chaos, which is not of their making (Siddiqui 2015b). 
Hence in the age of global finance the issue of creditworthiness has become a matter of 
importance for governments and it may be seen as prudent to pursue only those policies that 
are approved or in line with global finance (Fine 2014). Governments do not want to see 
sudden outflows and panic in the financial markets which may prove disastrous for the 
national economy (Epstein 2005a). In fact, the liberalisation of capital’s social obligations, 
such as priority sector lending targets and changes in differential interest rates, could have 
adverse consequences particularly for SMEs leading to a rise in unemployment (Siddiqui 
2014c). The government is obliged to defend large and global businesses and financial 
interests.  
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5. Experiences of Capital Liberalisation 
After the global financial crisis in 2008 many developing countries imposed capital control 
with the aim to regulate capital flows, especially to reduce foreign capital going into 
speculation. This step was supposed to help to keep inflationary pressures and pressures on 
currency appreciation under control.  
In December 2007, Taiwan imposed restrictions on capital inflows with the aim of 
minimising speculative pressures from overseas investors (Zhang 2009). Similarly, in June 
2015, Argentina imposed capital control and government charges of 6% were imposed on 
overseas investors. The experiences of Latin American countries in the 1990s tell us that the 
lack of macroeconomic balance-budget turned into current-account deficits. This suggests 
that inadequate regulation and supervision of the financial sector can have disastrous 
consequences. 
It seems that the mercantilist strategy of the East Asian countries rather than the open 
capital account policy of Latin America is preferable for developing economies. India’s 
capital account was opened to capital inflows on the grounds this would accelerate growth 
and investment, but its continuing trade deficit owing to the absence of real depreciation is a 
drag on the growth in income (Ghosh and Chandrasekhar 2009). Moreover, foreign capital 
inflows have not led to an investment boom in India. Klein (2012, 4) argues that “There may 
be political reasons that make it difficult to impose capital controls during booms.”  As the 
financial system is becoming increasingly integrated, it appears that the time horizons of FDI 
and portfolio capital investment are quite different. FDI is generally seen as long term while 
portfolio investment implies a narrower timespan. 
When Aizenman and Pasricha (2013) analysed the macroeconomic causes of changes in 
capital control on capital outflows in 22 emerging economies, they found that these were: 
fiscal concerns, overheating concerns, foreign exchange valuation concerns, macroeconomic 
stability and financial stability concerns. They concluded that the decision to liberalise capital 
concerns was related to net capital inflows such as higher appreciation pressure in the 
exchange market, and the accumulation of reserves. The currency appreciation generated by 
an upsurge in capital inflows can decrease export competitiveness and have an adverse 
impact on the manufacturing sector and employment situation within a country. The national 
government can fight exchange rate appreciation by accumulating international reserves.  
Epstein (2005b) defines financialization as, “The increasing role of financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of domestic and 
international economics” (Epstein 2005b, 4). He further says that the predominant form of 
capital is financial capital, since the financial sector has displaced the real or productive 
sector, relegating it to a subordinate position. Financialization works differently in countries 
where the financial system is based on capital markets and banking structures, and in 
developing countries these systems are unlikely to converge with Anglo-American market 
economies. The export sectors of developing countries are not able to attain current account 
surplus and they may find it increasingly difficult to attract capital inflows to balance their 
external sector. Therefore, in such circumstances these countries have to offer increased 
financial returns to foreign capital investors and lower wages in order for foreign markets to 
compete in the world market (Epstein 2005a). 
Prior to the 1981 economic crisis, Mexico followed import-substitution industrialisation 
(ISI), which produced a deep crisis and led to the dismantling of the government’s 
interventionist policies. Among the economic reforms adopted, the government began with a 
de-regulation programme aimed at introducing “efficiency” into the banking sector and 
reducing government intervention in the financial sector. Later, in 1990, the globalisation of 
Mexico’s financial system took place and its capital market was opened to foreign portfolio 
investments. Finally, in 2000, with the further implementation of NAFTA, which was signed 
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in 1994, Mexico adopted financial innovation, creating the conditions for securitization 
activities and greater involvement of both foreign international banks and corporations. As a 
result, these foreign companies increased their control over the banking and non-banking 
sectors such as investment banks, insurance companies and pension funds (Levy-Orlik 2014). 
The major activity of the foreign companies operating in the Mexico’s financial sector was to 
advance credits; however the availability of more capital did not benefit its economy. As 
Levy-Orlik (2014, 113–14) notes:  
 
The Mexican economy has not benefitted from greater access to credit. On the contrary, Mexico 
has the lowest ratio of credit to GDP (an average 14%) among Latin American countries. Small 
and medium-size businesses constitute an important sector that has reduced credit availability, 
partly because these businesses have little to no credit history or collateral and are therefore 
unable to guarantee payment in case of default. While the dynamic part of credit (channelled to 
households) has expanded, its share continues to be relatively small. 
 
The manufacturing sector, which had an important role under previous ISI strategies due 
to the adoption of NAFTA and market policies, did not experience drastic changes. Despite 
the increase in exports in the post-NAFTA period, the export sector was unable to achieve a 
surplus. Analysis of the country’s foreign trade deficit shows that the manufacturing sector 
deficit is higher than its total trade deficit. Despite the fall in overall investment spending, 
those manufacturing industries specialising in exports of high technology have done well, 
while the traditional manufacturing industries have experienced a sharp decline in exports. 
The high tech industries are based on the maquiladora structure, which specialises in 
assembling goods that have strong import content and thus, to increase exports, imports must 
go up (Levy-Orlik 2014). In Mexico, the banking sector has experienced profound 
institutional changes as bank ownership was transferred to foreign corporations, who took 
advantage of oligopolistic banking structures to gain further control over this sector. During 
this period of financialization and capital liberalisation the inflows of foreign capital and 
portfolio have increased, but to attract this international capital Mexico had to offer higher 
financial returns than those available on the global financial markets.  
Brazil increased its interest rates, as it felt it was necessary to stop capital outflows, 
which could have an adverse impact on output and employment. Despite removing tax on 
capital inflows in 2008, the Brazilian government re-imposed 2% tax on portfolio inflows in 
late 2009 (BCB 2014). These were modest efforts, aimed at slowing down the appreciation of 
the currency in the face of capital inflows into the country (Ostry et al. 2010; Sen 2007). 
In the 1990s Brazil began to accelerate the linkage of its financial systems with global 
finance. When Lula took over as president, he simply followed the measures taken previously 
by Cardoso’s government to prepare the Brazilian economy to participate fully in global 
finances. Since the 2000s, efforts were made to ensure the country’s close cooperation with 
global finances in order to offer high profits and it was realised that not trade but finance 
helped Brazil to integrate with the world economy. The Lula government took measures to 
consolidate the country’s position as a provider of cheap assets in the name of attracting 
finances. This becomes much clearer, if we consider the interest on foreign payments. This 
amount increased from US$ 12 billion in 1990 to US$ 21 billion in 2002, then US$ 29 billion 
in 2005, finally reaching more than US$ 35 billion in 2007. Growth in portfolio investment 
has been impressive increasing rapidly from US$ 400 million in 1990 to US$ 8 billion 2002 
and US$ 13 billion in 2007 (Kaltenbrunner and Painceira 2015) and the stocks of productive 
and financial assets owned by the non-residential have grown rapidly (BCB 2014). Brazil’s 
exports remained technologically backward and insufficiently dynamic in terms of world 
trade, becoming increasingly dominated by the agrarian sector, minerals and steel. In these 
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sectors Brazil has the competitive edge because of low wages and its abundant natural 
resources, especially land and water. 
Thailand imposed capital control in May 1997 and the aim was to stabilise foreign 
exchange and dampen speculative activities, as it was viewed that using interest rates as a 
means to defend the bhat. However, soon it was found that government measures were not 
comprehensive enough to eliminate the speculative pressure on the baht. As Edison and 
Reinhart (2000) study on capital control of Thailand (1997) and Malaysia (1998–99) find 
different results for both countries. Their studies focused on economic performance, foreign 
exchange reserves and capital flows, which concludes that:  
 
[It] emerges from our empirical work is that the controls used in Thailand did not appear to 
deliver much of what they were intended. By contrast, in the case of Malaysia, the controls did 
align more closely with the priors of what controls were intended to achieve—namely greater 
interest rate and exchange rate stability and more policy autonomy—although initially, at least, 
these measures did not prevent mutual funds from exiting the country . . . The results do suggest 
that the timing of capital controls and the types of controls that are plied might have something 
to do with the success of controls. (Edison and Reinhart 2000, 20) 
 
During periods of financial crisis developing countries such as Brazil, Colombia, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand have all used various capital control 
measures to control capital flows, especially short-term and speculative ones entering the 
country that could have had adverse effects on their economies in terms of asset markets and 
exchange rates. South Korea’s currency, the Won, appreciated rapidly in 2008 and the 
government set a limit on speculative capital and levied an outflow tax on capital gains of 
foreign purchases of government bonds. In return for financial assistance from the IMF, 
Thailand and South Korea adopted neoliberal reforms meaning that fiscal spending was 
reduced and interest rates were adjusted in the line with market-determined rates. 
An IMF study on capital control measures has provided some guidelines for member 
countries designed to minimise currency appreciation and asset bubbles during the 2008 
international financial crisis (IMF 2012). However, such recommendations were given under 
special circumstances. Ostry et al.’s (2010) study supported the policy of capital control to 
shorten the recession period. They also find that: “such controls, moreover, can retain their 
potency even if investors devise strategies to bypass them [. . .] the cost of circumvention 
strategies act like sand in the wheels” (Ostry et al. 2010, 5). 
After independence from Britain in 1947, India embarked on a policy of “import-
substitution,” in which industrialisation with the state playing a leading role was the 
“commanding height” of the economy (Siddiqui 2014a). In 1969, India’s then Prime 
Minister, Indira Gandhi, took a populist measure by nationalising fourteen commercial banks 
and a decade later, there was rising inefficiency in public sector organisations, which were 
allowed to borrow at high interest rates from these government-owned banks. All these 
strategies did not bring any long term solutions. However, in the 1980s, the Indian economy 
began to open up to foreign capital and envisaged a greater role for foreign trade. These 
market-oriented policies became more obvious in 1991, when India approached the IMF for a 
bail-out and in return accepted further implementation of neoliberal economic reforms that 
included opening up its economy for goods and capital, privatization of public industries and 
a roll-back in state involvement in the economy (Siddiqui 2014b). However, with increasing 
economic crisis in the 1980s, India moved towards assigning a greater role to foreign capital 
and overseas businesses, and significantly eased its capital control policy. Growing criticism 
of government financial repression to improve the performance of the financial sector led to 
formation of the government appointed Narsimham Committee in 1991 which recommended 
relaxing the interest rate ceilings amongst other things. To increase competition, foreign and 
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domestic banks were allowed to operate. Foreign capital inflows were encouraged and the 
companies were allowed to remit their principal, dividends and profits and sales proceeds 
(Siddiqui 2009a). 
Since early 1990s, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has moved towards market-oriented 
economic policies. Under such policies, issues related to the monetary transmission 
mechanism have gained increased importance. Prior to 1996, it only used quality instruments 
to control the amount of bank loans and the priority lending instrument was to meet the 
lending target in line with the “government’s developmental goals.” However, since 1997 the 
RBI has used the price instruments to indirectly control the amount of bank loans but also 
uses priority sector lending targets (Siddiqui 2009b). The central banks in developing 
countries take into account the foreign variables when setting their monetary policies. Often 
they have taken debts in foreign currencies, such as US dollars, and hence any default can 
make the situation worse than that of the central banks in these countries, so often the policy 
was to let the exchange rate fluctuate freely. Monetary policy in developing countries is 
constrained by the international banks such as Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank 
and Bank of Japan. Foreign trade is also primarily invoiced in US dollars; therefore, any 
drastic variations in exchange rates could have adverse effects on foreign trade. For these 
reasons, central banks in developing countries try to stabilise exchange rates without 
explicitly stating this. Since 2005, in India bank credit to the commercial sector has 
accounted for more than 70% of total domestic credit. The currency to deposit ratio has 
declined since 1999. It is also known that in India the bank plays a role in financial 
intermediation and that the non-financial sector lacks alternative sources of funding (Aleem 
2010; Siddiqui 2015a). Compared to those of developed countries, India’s capital markets are 
insufficiently developed. Thus, the central bank (i.e., RBI) stabilizes the exchange rate via 
interventions. 
There may be a reason why capital account convertibility may not be in the interest of an 
economy such as India. This may be due to government fiscal deficit, public debt and the 
capability of the financial sector to handle outflows. The budget deficit could then be 
transformed into a current account deficit and could possibly cause large depreciation. 
Capital inflows (except short-term debt) have been liberalised, meaning that quantitative 
restrictions have been removed and there are no bars to repatriation of both principal and 
return on these flows (Ghosh and Chandrasekhar 2009). 
India took further measures to control capital in mid-2007, which were aimed at 
reducing the volume of capital inflows and the appreciation of the Rupee, discouraging 
portfolio capital inflows and decreasing the volatility on the Mumbai stock exchange. Balin 
concluded that for various reasons these measures achieved very little. He pointed out that the 
majority of the government’s stated goals were unattainable and investors were able to 
circumvent the capital control measures. During this period, corruption and favouritism was 
rampant within the RBI and securities and in practice the policy tilted in favour of large 
corporations (Balin 2008).  
Since the early 1980s, many developing countries have adopted measures of capital 
liberalization and these policies should be seen against the broader context of the global 
policy change in favour of market-friendly development strategies, also known in developing 
countries as the “Structural Adjustment Programme,” a policy recommended by the IMF and 
the World Bank (Bonizzi 2014; Siddiqui 1994). 
The ascendancy of finance has sought to reduce the autonomy of national decisions and 
control over monetary and fiscal policies. At present, developing economies are very 
vulnerable and the short-term capital flows that follow capital liberalization can lead to 
further economic fluctuations, inhibiting government ability to counter such tendencies that 
arise from outside sources (Crotty and Epstein 1999; Fine 2014). 
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The year 2015 was a difficult one for emerging markets, since not only did exports of 
goods and services decline but they even turned negative for some previously buoyant 
exporters. It was also a time when capital flow reversed the course. IMF data shows that net 
capital flows into developing Asia declined significantly in 2014, marking a shift from the 
previous boom period for emerging markets, especially those in Asia. However, it appears 
that 2015 was even more devastating for emerging markets across the world, including those 
in Asia. Figure 3 illustrates how serious the swings in capital flows were. 
 
 
Figure 3. Net Capital Flows to/from Emerging Asia (US$ billion) 
Source: IMF. 2016. Institute of International Finance, “Capital Flows to Emerging Markets,” 19 
January, IIF: Washington D.C. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Change in Reserves and Current Account Balance in Emerging Asia (US$ billion) 
Source: IMF. 2016. Institute of International Finance, “Capital Flows to Emerging Markets,” 
19 January, IIF: Washington D.C. 
 
 
With the on-going global economic crisis, it is clear that capital flight from the emerging 
countries of Asia, for example, has risen sharply as shown in Figure 3. Taking the total of net 
inflows from non-residents into emerging markets across all regions minus the total of net 
capital outflows made by residents, and adding the effect of errors and omissions, the reports 
show a surprisingly large figure of US$ 735 billion net capital outflow in 2015, compared to 
a net outflow of US$ 111 billion for the previous year. Much of this was driven by China, 
where net capital outflow in 2015 amounted to US$ 676 billion, including US$ 216 billion in 
16 
 
unrecorded net outflows. However, even excluding China, emerging markets as a group 
experienced negative capital flows in both 2014 and 2015 (IMF 2016). 
The net capital inflows from non-residents to all emerging markets remained positive in 
2015 at an estimated US$ 293 billion. However, the more significant factor was that residents 
of these emerging markets took their money elsewhere: net private capital outflows by 
residents amounted to as much as US$ 824 billion, and the trend was evident in terms of both 
foreign equity investment and lending patterns. Unrecorded flows in the form of errors and 
omissions contributed to this haemorrhaging, amounting to as much as US$ 206 billion. 
Figure 4 indicates the dramatic swings in the direction of net capital flows that have occurred 
in just three years. Net non-resident capital inflows into these seven Asian countries declined 
from nearly US$ 700 billion in 2013 to an estimated negative figure of around US$ 18 billion 
in 2015 (IMF 2016). 
The net inflow of US$ 98 billion in 2013 has become a net outflow of as much as US$ 
216 billion estimated for 2015. Once again this is hugely driven by what is happening in 
China in terms of unrecorded capital flight—the IIF estimates Errors and Omissions in the 
Chinese balance of payments to be greater than US$ 200 billion in 2015. Figure 4 shows that 
the estimated current account surplus in China for 2015 is US$ 270 billion, but in fact of 
these Asian countries, only India and Indonesia showed a deterioration in their current 
account balances (which were already in deficit) between 2014 and 2015 (IMF 2016). The 
other countries experienced slight improvements in their current account balances—but this 
did not prevent the substantial capital outflow.  
The Minsky’s criticism of capital account liberalisation directs us towards rent-seeking 
and speculation, which are expected to increase with the rise of cross-border capital flows in 
the developing countries. (Minsky 1986) It means that financial de-regulation could lead to 
financial instability. As Mitchell and Toporowski (2014) note:  
 
[Financial] deregulation is deemed to be an exogenous policy choice imposed on developing 
countries at the behest of the International Monetary Fund for the convenience of international 
banks. This forced liberalization is supposed to be the key issue for the political economy. 
(Mitchell and Toporowski 2014, 76). 
 
In fact, in the developing countries, the capital market operates under more complex system 
of corporate finance including multinational corporations, public enterprises and relatively 
small number of domestic private enterprises, who are more vulnerable to foreign capital 
inflows (Levy 2012; Fine 2014). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Since early 1980s, the IMF was sceptical of the regulation of cross-border financial flows. 
However, after the 2008 global financial crisis, the IMF extended support to Brazil and 
Iceland for the use of capital control on outflows to both prevent and mitigate financial crisis. 
In the past mainstream economists viewed capital as an optimal policy in the long period for 
all countries and emphasised that the regulation of capital flows as inherently distortionary 
from that optimum. Despite the fact that most of the econometric analyses of capital account 
liberalisation found no rigorous link between capital account liberalisation and growth in 
developing countries. This change of opinion is a good development. As Gallagher and Tian 
note,  
 
The IMF underwent a significant re-evaluation of its policy on capital account liberalisation and 
the role of capital controls in the wake of global financial crisis . . . The financial crises had a 
significant impact on IMF diagnosis of whether capital flows are a source of vulnerability in 
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merging markets . . . By controlling the vulnerability of the economy, the effect of crises becomes 
insignificant. (Gallagher and Tian 2017, 11) 
 
This study has argued that capital controls are important macroeconomic measures that a 
country can use to prevent and mitigate financial crisis. The policies should be subject to 
broader debate. Here is this context the question, what is the social benefit of capital inflows 
one that is directly addressed in policy formulations that then needs to be regulated, as Joan 
Robinson warned:  
 
It is easy enough to make models on stated assumptions. The difficulty is to find the assumptions 
that are relevant to reality . . . Even if the crises that are looming up are overcome and a new run 
of prosperity lies ahead, deeper problem will still remain. Modern capitalism has no purpose 
except to keep the show going . . . It should be the duty of economists to do their best to 
enlighten the public about the economic aspects of these menacing problems. (Robinson 1971, 
142–43) 
 
Further this study has argued that the restrictions on capital mobility will enable 
developing countries to exercise monetary autonomy and stable exchange rates. In the face of 
the 2008 global financial crisis, India and China, for instance, slowed down their plans to 
liberalise their capital account (Siddiqui 2010). India, like China, has not fully liberalised 
capital flows and short-term debt inflows in particular have remained under tight control. 
Even this did help them maintain stability during the global financial crisis of the 2008. In 
order to reduce the frequency of financial crises, developing countries need to take measures 
towards controlling capital inflows and outflows. For instance, inflows control might reduce 
the risk of financial crisis as they should prevent large inflows and also reduce excessive 
lending and short-term speculation and borrowing. Outflows control would reduce the risk of 
sudden capital outflows if foreign capital decides to pull out of the country.  
The current study has found that financial liberalisation strengthens international capital 
and by assigning complete authority of the central banks, governments have little policy 
control over monetary and exchange rate. Increased power is transformed to bureaucrats and 
financiers who control international financial institutions. It is suggested that to protect the 
developing economies from the instability associated with the financial globalisation some 
degree of capital control is required. A new situation arises where during the sudden change 
in the international economy and it is important to know how to prevent shockwaves from 
affecting the economy. Those economies which are integrated into the international capital 
may prove to be at the mercy of external forces, in the absence of any control on capital and 
exchange rates. There is no doubt that in such circumstances capital control seems to be a 
useful tool for controlling capital movements and maintaining economic stability and 
sustainable growth in the developing countries. 
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